摘要： 以2011-2015年中国沪深A股上市公司为样本，实证研究了职称论文发表价格2015年股市震荡期间上市公司异常停牌、CEO风险偏好与公司风险承担之间的关系。结果表明，CEO在股市震荡期间采取异常停牌是一种偏好风险的表现，并与公司风险承担具有一致性。股市下跌期间，异常停牌对公司市值有保护作用；但异常停牌公司承担了更高的风险，CEO的高风险行为还使得公司采取更高的经营杠杆率、投入更多资金用于发明创新、公司有更多的并购行为等冒险特征。本文的研究对于进一步认识CEO风险偏好与公司风险承担之间的关系具有借鉴意义，也为监管部门加强上市公司的停牌管理提供了依据。
关键词： 异常停牌；CEO风险特征；公司风险承担；市值管理

LU Jing^*， ZHANG Lei， XIANG Cheng

（  School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University；  ）

Abstract： Based on the data of listed companies in A-share markets of Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2011 to 2015, this study analyzes the relationship among abnormal trading halts, CEO risk preference and corporate risk-taking during the stock market turmoil in mid-2015. The results show that the abnormal trading halts decided by the CEOs during the stock market shock are a kind of risk behavior and consistent with the corporate risk-taking. During the downturn, the abnormal trading halts have protective effects on the market value of these companies. However, the abnormal trading halts make companies take higher risk. The high-risk behavior of these CEOs also makes the company take a higher operating leverage, invest more funds for inventions, take more M&A behavior and other risk characteristics. This study is helpful for further understanding the relationship between CEO risk behavior and corporate risk-taking. It also provides a basis for supervising departments to strengthen trading halts management.?
Keywords： Abnormal trading halts; CEO risk characteristics; Corporate risk-taking; Market value management